

# Continuous Compliance


Martin Kellogg<sup>a</sup>, Martin Schäf<sup>b</sup>, Serdar Tasiran<sup>b</sup>, Michael D. Ernst<sup>a,b</sup>

<sup>a</sup>University of Washington <sup>b</sup>Amazon Web Services



How do I know it's secure? You Customer






	Traditional
Development	code review, keep compliance in mind
Preparation	
Review	


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#### **Problems:**





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Review	randomly sample, manually check evidence

#### **Problems:**

- Cost
- Judgment
- Sampling

	Traditional	Problems:
Development	code review, keep compliance in mind	<ul><li>Cost</li><li>Judgment</li><li>Sampling</li></ul>
Preparation	gather evidence from each engineering team	<ul> <li>Regressions</li> </ul>
Review	randomly sample, manually check evidence	

# Continuous Compliance

- Build verification tools for compliance controls
- On each commit, run verifier in continuous integration
- Report failures directly to developers

	Traditional	Continuous
Development	code review, keep compliance in mind	
Preparation	gather evidence from each engineering team	
Review	randomly sample, manually check evidence	15

	Traditional	Continuous
Development	code review, keep compliance in mind	write specifications, verifier runs in Cl
Preparation	gather evidence from each engineering team	
Review	randomly sample, manually check evidence	16

	Traditional	Continuous
Development	code review, keep compliance in mind	write specifications, verifier runs in CI
Preparation	gather evidence from each engineering team	none
Review	randomly sample, manually check evidence	17

	Traditional	Continuous
Development	code review, keep compliance in mind	write specifications, verifier runs in Cl
Preparation	gather evidence from each engineering team	none
Review	randomly sample, manually check evidence	auditor checks output of verifier

Cost

verifier

- Judgment
- Sampling
- Regressions

	Traditional	Continuous
Development	code review, keep compliance in mind	write specifications, verifier runs in CI
Preparation	gather evidence from each engineering team	none
Review	randomly sample, manually	auditor checks output of

check evidence

Cost

verifier

Judgment

Sampling

Regressions

	Traditional	Continuous
Development	code review, keep compliance in mind	write specifications, verifier runs in Cl
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check evidence

• Idea: verification is a good fit for compliance

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- Hard-coded credentials

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#### **Techniques:**

Constant propagation

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- Cryptographic algorithm selection
- Cloud data store initialization
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- Constant propagation
- + enum analysis

#### **Controls:**

- HTTP vs HTTPS
- Cryptographic key length
- Cryptographic algorithm selection + regex matching
- Cloud data store initialization
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- + enum analysis
- + regex matching
- + accumulation analysis
- + dataflow

# Analysis strategy

# Analysis strategy: type systems

- Familiar to developers
- Predictable
- Scalable
- Sound

### **Evaluation**

- 1. Run all verifiers on 492 open-source projects
- 2. Compare verifiers to existing tools
- 3. Case study of a verifier in a real, industrial compliance workflow
- 4. Case study of two verifiers as part of industrial security scans

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# Open-source projects

- 492 projects from GitHub, 5.7 million LoC
  - Use type inference and build scanning to automate process

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  - Use type inference and build scanning to automate process
- Triage into 4 categories:

verified, no warnings

#### **Real violations:**


true positives: all warnings are real violations


False warnings:

**false positives**: warnings, no real violations

true and false positives: some warnings are real


#### **Real violations:**





#### Takeaways:

 ~1/2 open-source projects have compliance violations



#### **Takeaways:**

- ~1/2 open-source projects have compliance violations
- ~2/3 projects cause no false positives from our tools

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- Used a CryptoAPIBench, a previously-published benchmark
- Only compared on categories covered by our tools (11/16)
- Four other tools:
  - SpotBugs
  - Coverity
  - CogniCrypt<sub>SAST</sub> (CrySL)
  - CryptoGuard

Tool	SpotBugs	Coverity	CrySL	CryptoGuard	Ours
Precision					
Recall					

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Only ours are suitable for compliance: auditors won't accept a tool that has **false negatives** 

### **Evaluation**

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- external auditor

# Why does it eliminate the need for trust?

```
public SecretKey getKMSKey(int keyLength) {
 GenerateDataKeyRequest r = new GenerateDataKeyRequest();
 if (keyLength == 128) {
     r.withKeySpec(DataKeySpec.AES 128);
 else {
     r.withKeySpec(DataKeySpec.AES 256);
```

# Why does it eliminate the need for trust?

```
public SecretKey getKMSKey(int keyLength) {
 GenerateDataKeyRequest r = new GenerateDataKeyRequest();
 else {
     r.withKeySpec(DataKeySpec.AES 256);
```

51

# Why does it eliminate the <u>need</u> for trust?

```
public SecretKey getKMSKey(int
  GenerateDataKeyRequest r =
                                             ataKeyRequest();
                    228)
     <u>Lkeylength</u>
  else {
     r.withKeySpec(D
                            Spec.AES 256);
```

52

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per team, per audit, per control

- external auditor

developer

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
# AWS case study 2: security scanning

- key-length and crypto-algorithm verifiers
- scan all security-relevant (not just compliance relevant) code


# Industrial projects

**Real violations:** verified (37,315)true positives (173) False warnings: false positives (1) true and false positives (0)

# Industrial projects



# Industrial projects



#### 1. Verification is a good fit for compliance

- a. auditors require soundness (no false negatives)
- b. most controls are local and simple (human-checkable)

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- b. research impact from focusing on other stakeholders

#### 3. Verification can save time for developers

- a. don't add a new task, replace an existing task
- b. verification is easier than tasks developers already do

### Contributions

- Idea: verification is a good fit for compliance
- Engineering: we built verifiers for five compliance controls
- Experimental: open-source experiments and comparisons
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Tools and data are publicly available: see paper for links

• Cost: lost engineering time, paying auditors, failed audits, etc.

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- **Judgment**: humans can make mistakes
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- **Regressions**: only checked at audit-time

```
void makeCipher() {
    Cipher.getInstance("AES");
}
```

```
void makeCipher() {
    Cipher.getInstance("AES");
}

String
```

```
void makeCipher() {
    Cipher.getInstance("AES");
}

@StringVal("AES") String
```

```
void makeCipher() {
      Cipher.getInstance("AES");
@StringVal("AES") String
     Type qualifier
```